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ABSTRACT
Kurth, Andrew Hamilton; M.S.; Department of Agribusiness and Applied  Economics; College of
Agriculture,  Food Systems, and  Natural  Resources;  North  Dakota State University;  May 2009. A
Stochastic Simulation of the  North Dakota  Ethanol Production Incentive. Major Professor: Dr. Cole
R. Gustafson.
The objective of this research is to determine the effect the North Dakota  Ethanol
Production  Incentive has on ethanol plant survivability. This thesis uses a stochastic simulation to
show the financial performance of an ethanol plant with and without subsidy support. Historical
corn and ethanol prices are used to simulate market conditions a typical ethanol might face. Using
the forecast prices, an ethanol plant balance sheet was created to show how a plant would
perform in  normal market conditions, as well as how the plant would  perform with the Ethanol
Production Incentive and also with alternative subsidy structures that were developed. The results
showed the Ethanol Production Incentive was the most effective subsidy tested and it does
appear to improve plant balance sheets to a certain extent during a downturn.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
1.1.        Problem statement
The modern ethanol industry began in the  1970s in the wake of the Arab oil embargo.
The  U.S. government passed the National  Energy Act in  1978, part of which was the Energy
Policy Act that launched the ethanol industry by subsidizing ethanol 40 cents per gallon.
Since 1978, the federal ethanol subsidy has ranged between 40 and 60 cents per gallon. The
federal subsidy today is 45 cents per gallon for corn-based ethanol and $1.01 per gallon for
cellulosic-based ethanol (Jessup, 2009). Over the past 30 years, various acts of legislation
have been passed that have led to an increased usage of ethanol in fuels. Farmers have
been strong proponents of ethanol because the ethanol industry has strengthened demand
for corn and support for commodity prices.
The ethanol industry has experienced major growth in recent years due to rising oil
prices, favorable national  legislation and improving technologies, making ethanol more
competitive in the energy industry.  Many of the maj.or agricultural producing states have
extensive support programs to encourage new ethanol plant construction, make ethanol
more price competitive, and increase ethanol demand.  Major questions have been raised
with regard to the efficacy of these subsidies: how they are structured, how they impact the
market, who benefits, and who potentially is adversely affected.
North  Dakota's Ethanol Production  Incentive is designed to support new ethanol plants
during economic downturns. The program operates by linking subsidy payments to both
corn and ethanol prices. An analysis of the  Ethanol Production  Incentive is necessary to help
North Dakota determine whether its ethanol support programs reduce probability of plant
closure.
The Ethanol Production Incentive, passed by the State of North Dakota to protect
ethanol producers from  high corn  prices, resulted in the state making substantial payments
to ethanol producers (State of North Dakota, 2007). Questions have been raised regarding
whether this is the best use of the state's tax dollars, what kind of impact the subsidy is
having on the state ethanol producers and whether there are viable alternatives to the
current subsidy program.
1.2.        Objectives and Hypothesis
The study examines the current Ethanol Production Incentive that North Dakota uses to
support the ethanol industry. The research involves developing a model to demonstrate the
impact of the current program  using a  Monte Carlo Simulation. The model is used to
determine the most efficient structure for the Ethanol  Production Incentive, that is, the
program that has the most positive impact on plant survivability.  It is expected that the
North Dakota subsidy for ethanol producers has improved plant rate of return on equity and
reduced plant risk of bankruptcy.  It also is expected that the alternative subsidy structures
may provide greater improvements either in plant survivability or lower program costs.
Table  1.1 shows historical payments to ethanol producers since the ethanol  production
incentive came into effect.  These figures can be used with historical corn and ethanol prices
to measure the accuracy of forecast subsidy payments. Figures are from Energy Outreach
and Special Programs,  North  Dakota  Department of Commerce.
1.3.        Thesis overview
The thesis is organized into six chapters, including the introduction in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 reviews literature regarding the history of ethanol production and the importance
of subsidies to the ethanol industry. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical model. Chapter 4
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Table 1.1.  Historical  Payments Made to Ethanol Producers since the Ethanol Production
Incentive Came into Effect.
A Plerits in operation AFLer 1995
use-3ItB
*Olen+t2108
Source: (Energy Outreach and Special Programs, 2009)
presents the empirical model and describes the data sources, prices, distributions and
alternative subsidy structures. Chapter 5 reports the simulation results showing a plant with
no subsidy and then the same plant with the different subsidies being tested. Chapter 6
discusses the results,  limitations and  recommendations for future study.
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2.1.
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Brief History of Ethanol[
Ethanol was first used as a fuel in an engine developed by Samuel Morey in 1826.
During the Civil War, ethanol was taxed as a  liquor to help raise money for the war effort.  In
1908, Henry Ford's first automobile, the Model T, was designed to be able to run on either
ethanol or gasoline.  In the 1920s, ethanol became popular as an additive in gasoline to
prevent engine knocking. The first U.S. ethanol plant was built in the 1940s by the  U.S. Army
for fuel production.  For the next three decades, virtually no commercial ethanol fuel was
sold due to  low gasoline  prices.
Before government action, there was only a marginal market for domestically produced
ethanol fuels. The cost of producing ethanol was greater than the price consumers were
willing to pay. During the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970s, the  U.S. government
responded by passing the Energy Tax Act of 1978, which included an exemption of the 4
cents/gallon federal fuel excise tax on gasoline for fuel blended with at least 10% ethanol
(Whipnet Technologies, 2007).  In the late 1970s, ethanol usage increased as it was blended
more with gasoline to reduce carbon monoxide emissions.  To further promote
environmentally friendly fuels, the Crude Oil Windfall  Profit Tax Act and the Energy Security
Act were signed into law in 1980. This legislation was designed to encourage energy
conservation and domestic fuel development (Whipnet Technologies, 2007). In the 1980s,
ethanol  became more commonly used as an oxygenate for gasoline  Ethyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (ETBE), a fuel made from ethanol and  petroleum, to reduce carbon monoxide
1 Information from the first three paragraphs was taken from the Fuel-Testers ethanol fuel history page.
Fuel-Testers 2008. Available at http://www.fuel-testers.com/ethanol   fuel   historv.html.  [Accessed
September, 2008].
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emissions and smog. These early subsidies and favorable legislation were critical in making
the ethanol industry commercially viable.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 required winter usage of oxygenated fuels in
areas where carbon monoxide levels were not meeting EPA emissions standards. It also
mandated year-round use of oxygenates in areas that were the farthest from meeting EPA
ozone standards. The 1992 Energy Policy Act legislation was signed into law to decrease
national dependence on fuel imports by requiring some fleets to use alternative fuel
vehicles.  In  1999, several states banned the gasoline additive Methyl Tert-Butyl  Ether
(MTBE) when traces of it were found in drinking water. By 2004,  MTBE was banned as a fuel
additive in most of the country. The phasing out of MTBE left ETBE as the primary fuel
oxygenate in the United States.
At the turn of the century, maj.or U.S. auto manufacturers began selling Flexible Fuel
Vehicles (FFVs), which can run on gasoline blends of up to 85% ethanol. The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 was the first federal legislation that required the use of renewable fuels.  It also
included  regulations to ensure gasoline sold in the United States contained a  minimum
volume of renewable fuel, setting a target of 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel production
by 2012 (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005).
The  Renewable  Fuel Standard  Program (RFS) was signed  into law in September 2006.
This national-level renewable fuel program was intended to increase the blending of
renewable fuels (ethanol) into automobile gasoline. The national Renewable  Fuels Standard
(RES) mandated doubling the use of ethanol and biodiesel by 2012 from 2006 levels.
In  December 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act was passed; it included
provisions which raised  renewable fuel (ethanol) production requirements to 15 billion
gallons by 2015 and  36 billion gallons by 2022 (of this, 21  billion gallons were  required to
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come from cellulosic and other advanced biofuels). More recently, throughout 2007-2008
an increasing number of individual states began requiring at least 10% ethanol in gasoline.
In 2008, ethanol  production  reached 9 billion gallons.
These legislative acts have served as a catalyst for the recent dramatic growth in the
ethanol industry. An April 2007 poll found that 70% of the public thought ethanol was a
``good idea" and agreed with the statement that ethanol made from corn is an American-
made substitute for foreign oil that causes less air pollution (CBS News/New York Times Poll
2007). The survey highlighted the strong public support ethanol has had in recent years;
this support is another reason the government has promoted ethanol more aggressively.
Ethanol production in the United States has grown dramatically in recent years;
however, at present that growth has slowed significantly. Today's ethanol industry is a
direct result of subsidies and  regulations, at both the federal and state levels, aimed at
promoting ethanol use, especially corn ethanol. Without government support, the ethanol
industry would  not exist (Perrin, Fretes, & Sesmero, 2008).
According to a study published in the Proceedt.ngs o/ the IVcrti.oncr/ Acc}demy of sc/.ences,
ethanol and biodiesel generate more energy than is consumed to produce it (Hill,  Nelson,
Tilman, Polasky, & Tiffany, 2008). Ethanol yields produced 25% more energy than the energy
invested in its production, while biodiesel yields 93% more energy than what is invested in
its production. These figures take into account the energies needed to process the fuels and
produce the crop, as well as the energy required for all the inputs used to help produce the
crop.  Another important result of the study was its determination that if the entire U.S.
corn and soybean crop were used for the production of biofuels, it would only meet 12% of
gasoline and 6% of diesel demand. These numbers show that from an energy output
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perspective, biofuels produce more energy than they take to produce, yet alone they cannot
meet U.S. energy needs.
2.2.         Implications of subsidies in the Ethanol Industry
Until recently, the ethanol industry has experienced enormous growth. U.S. ethanol
production climbed to 9 billion gallons in 2008, an increase of more than 2.5  billion gallons
from 2007 (Renewable Fuels Association, 2009). The rapid expansion in U.S. ethanol
production resulted from higher oil  prices during the past several years along with the
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and current biofuels programs already in place
(Wescott, 2007). Over the past 20 years, improvements in technology and efficiency have
led to a 30% decrease in production costs (Gallagher, Shapouri, & Brubaker, 2007). The
improvements in technology have helped  boost the overall profitability of the ethanol
industry by giving plants more capacity to absorb volatile commodity prices and are a
notable factor in the recent building boom in the industry. Another factor leading to greater
growth has been recent high oil prices, which made ethanol much more competitive and
spurred government action to boost the industry in order to decrease dependence on
foreign energy sources.
With these improvements in technology and efficiency, some have questioned the need
for the government to continue subsidizing the ethanol industry. There are several reasons
the ethanol industry continues to rely on subsidies. While an ethanol plant's ability to
generate a profit has improved, the federal ethanol subsidy remains crucial in keeping the
price of ethanol competitive. The volatile prices of inputs, such as corn and energy, have
also had a negative impact on the ethanol industry's economic performance. The State of
North Dakota passed the April 2003 Ethanol Production Incentive for several reasons. One
was to protect the local ethanol industry from volatile commodity prices.  Rural
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development was another reason the state found it necessary to support the industry. A 50-
million-gallon per year (MGY) ethanol plant consumes 18.2 million bushels of corn per year
with feedstock accounting for two-thirds of overall operational spending (Urbanchuck,
2006). Construction of a 50 MGY plant generates $209 million (2005 dollar value) of new
annual gross output for the local economy, while a 100 MGY plant will generate $406
million annually. At the state  level, a 50 MGY ethanol  plant adds $115 million annually to
the economy as measured by gross state output (Urbanchuck, 2006). These numbers
indicate that the state economy should grow because of the operations of the ethanol
industry (Urbanchuck, 2006).
The bankruptcy of Verasun Energy in October 2008 due to poor hedging choices and
Glacier Energy looking for more investor contributions are two prime examples that reveal
how the ethanol industry is still sensitive to market fluctuations. When corn prices are high
and ethanol prices are low, even well-managed ethanol producers can struggle to remain
profitable. The  North Dakota  Ethanol Production Incentive is designed for this type of
situation; its success in helping plants survive adverse market conditions will determine
whether it should  be kept in its current form, significantly altered or simply repealed.
Arguments also have been made against subsidizing ethanol in any form, blaming the
corn-based ethanol plants for driving up the price of commodities and contending that
ethanol plants consume more energy than they produce. A study prepared by the
Congressional Research Service showed that ``U.S. ethanol production in 2006 consumed
roughly 17% of the U.S. corn crop and the futures contract for March 2007 corn on the
Chicago Board of Trade, rose from $2.50 per bushel in September 2006 to a contract high of
over $4.16 per bushel in January 2007 (a rise of 66%)" (Yacobucci & Schnepf, 2007, pp. 4,7).
With market data showing the biofuels sector would have been profitable during much of
2006 without being subsidized (Perrin,  Fretes, & Sesmero, 2008), questions have been
raised as to whether the continued subsidizing of ethanol production is necessary. These
concerns are focused on possible side effects that could result from excessive federal
incentives; incentives that have already led to the recent expansion of ethanol production
capacity and growth in demand for corn to supply future ethanol production.
Another point of contention over the ethanol industry is the effect ethanol plants have
on the economy and the environment beyond the resources they consume. Structural
concerns such as upgrading refinery infrastructure, as well as changes needed in engine
design to accommodate larger proportions of ethanol in fuel are a direct result of increased
ethanol use (Yacobucci & Schnepf, 2007). The environmental ramifications of increased
biofuels production are another point to consider. Concerns exist over using food to
produce fuel and whether the energy benefit from a fuel produced by natural gas and farm
machinery is efficient enough to be justified. Another concern is land  use change. According
to Searchinger, if increased biofuels usage boosts demand for corn and pushes commodity
prices higher, it would accelerate forest and grassland conversion to farmland even if
surplus farmland exists elsewhere. The results of that study showed that if corn ethanol
production was completely emission-free except for land-use change, overall greenhouse
gas emissions would still be projected to increase over a 30-year period (Searchinger, et al.,
2008).
A 2006 study by Swenson and Eathington examined the actual impact that new plant
construction has on the local economy. They found that local job creation was exaggerated
by assuming increased demand for corn would boost farming jobs. In reality, a surplus of
corn still exists and increased efficiency continues to reduce the manpower needed for corn
production. They noted local job creation was dependent on how much of the plant was
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actually owned locally (Swenson & Eathington, 2006). Another issue is the variable levels of
sulfur in dried  distillers grains (DDGS), which can  be  used  as livestock feed.  Highly variable
sulfur levels in  DDGS, however, can affect animal performance and  health (Lane, 2007).
Issues such as the quality of DDGS are highly relevant as DDGS are an important source of
income to ethanol producers. Water usage has been another issue of contention, with many
local towns, farmers and livestock operations concerned about the quantity of water that
ethanol producers consume.
Before deciding whether or not the government ethanol subsidies should be ended or
drastically reduced, the impact of doing so must be examined. A 2007 study by Kruse et al.
simulated the impact if the 51 cents per gallon ethanol tax credit, the 54 cents per gallon
ethanol import tariff, and the $1.00 per gallon biodiesel tax credit were permitted to expire.
The study used a stochastic model to analyze the impact of the removal of the above
subsidies but left the Renewable  Fuel Standard  mandating a  minimum use of ethanol in
place. Their results showed that future growth in biofuels is greatly reliant on the federal tax
credits and the import tariff. They project ethanol production would contract by 30% and
biodiesel production by more than half (this includes the recent capacity growth). Their
results showed  net returns would fall so dramatically that a  large number of plants would
close due to an inability to cover operating costs (Kruse, Westhoff, Meyer, & Thompson,
2007).
Another study by Perrin et al. examined the technical efficiency of the corn ethanol
industry and its economic viablility. They examined seven average dry grind ethanol plants
and found that from 2006 through 2007, average ethanol prices were 66 cents per gallon
above the plant shutdown level (over variable operating  costs). They also figured about 35
cents per gallon for interest and depreciation, and concluded net operating returns from the
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sample period would  be large enough to encourage continued  new plant construction.
However,  recent market volatility,the failure of Verasun, and the financial difficulties of
other large ethanol producers have shown that the federal subsidy may not be sufficient.
The study also found  plants are vulnerable to the volitile prices of corn and when using
more recent corn prices from July, 2008, the same plants would be 16 cents per gallon over
shutdown level.  Furthermore, without the federal 51 cents per gallon subsidy, operating
revenues would drop to about 36 cents per gallon, leading to a large number of plants
shutting down. (Perrin,  Fretes, & Sesmero, 2008). This illustrates how crucial the federal 51
cents per gallon  subsidy is to the ethanol industry.
A major political objective of ethanol subsidies is to benefit corn producers. The ability
of seed producers and corn processors to take relatively large shares of the subsidy benefits
when they can leverage market power is extremely relevant to the policy debate (Saitone,
Sexton, & Sexton, 2007). When the seed companies and ethanol processors have oligopoly
market power, the absolute benefits and share of benefits of the subsidy attained by
farmers is sharply reduced. (Saitone, Sexton, & Sexton, 2007). Thus, much of the subsidy
intended for corn producers is instead directed toward other players in ethanol production.
Another study regarding the impact of government support by Du et al. examines the
net welfare change caused by the U.S. ethanol subsidy. Their findings were unusual because
the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics would imply that the market-distorting
ethanol subsidy should not be welfare enhancing and their results directly conflict with the
theorem. (Du, Hayes, & Baker, 2008). The reason for this is that markets for agricultural
commodities were not competitive prior to large-scale ethanol production due to farm
subsidies (Du, Hayes, & Baker, 2008). Their results show the ethanol subsidy  alone is market
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distorting, but the subsidy actually reduces the distortion from farm subsidies in agricultural
commodity markets, with the combined effect being a reduction of net market distortion.
Another aspect of subsidies that should be examined is whether the subsidy is fixed or
variable. The federal government currently has a 51 cents per gallon ethanol blended with
gasoline credit. A 2006 study by Quear & Tyner developed a variable subsidy to compare
with the fixed subsidy currently in place. They used a Tiffany-Eidman profit model to
examine the efficiency of the subsidies and estimate government costs and producer risk.
The study found that a variable rate subsidy cost the government 37% less than the current
program and reduced producer risk by 21% compared with the current subisdy (Quear &
Tyner, 2006).
Another study conducted in 2007 by Taheripour & Tyner used production functions,
probable values of supply and demand elasticities, substitution elasticities, and  market
shares. They concluded that with a competitve market and no fuel standard, the share of
the ethaonl subsidy between ethanol and gasoline producers  depends on their supply
elasticities and the elasticity of substitution  between ethanol and gasoline (Taheripour &
Tyner, 2007). This implies that when supply elasticity of corn decreases, farmers receive a
larger share of the subsidy,but they also found that with the fuel standard and limited
ethanol production capacity, producers should receive the entirety of the ethanol subsidy
(Taheripour & Tyner, 2007). The study also showed ethanol production boosts demand for
corn and in the longer term will push up demand for land as farmers try to increase output
from a  limited supply of land (Taheripour & Tyner, 2007).
More recently, ethanol producers have been faced with increasingly difficult market
conditions. When cost-cutting measures and investment are no longer sufficient to keep the
plant profitable, ethanol producers are faced with the choice of continuing to operate at a
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loss or shutting down.  An important lesson from elementary microeconomics is that a firm
should  be shut down if operating revenues are less than variable costs (MCDonald & Siegel,
1985). A plant in Grafton, North D akota,   made that choice and shut down temporarily to
wait for corn  prices to fall or ethanol prices to rise (Shirek, 2007). Another plant in Pratt,
Kansas , also suspended operations due to   high corn prices but continued to employ the
staff and used the downtime to undertake large maintence projects (Holmseth, 2008).
To help reduce the likelihood of ethanol plants closing from high corn and ethanol price
gaps, North Dakota passed legislation creating the Ethanol  Production  Incentive , which is
designed to ease the financial burden of high corn prices and low ethanol prices. This
legislation includes   payments for increased ethanol production at existing plants, as well as
payments for higher corn prices.
If the average quarterly price per bushel of corn is above one dollar and eighty
cents, for each one cent by which the quarterly price is above one dollar and eighty
cents, the Office of Renewable Energy and  Energy Efficiency shall add to the amount
payable under this section one-tenth of one cent times the number of gallons of
ethanol produced  by the eligible facility during the quarter. (State of North Dakota,
2007)
The legislation also has a mechanism to reduce the payment when ethanol passes a
certain  price per gallon.  It states:
lf the average quarterly rack price per gallon of ethanol is above one dollar and
thirty cents, for each one cent by which the average quarterly rack price is above
one dollar and thirty cents, the Office of Renewable Energy and  Energy Efficiency
shall subtract from the amount payable under this section, two-tenths of one cent
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times the number of gallons of ethanol produced  by the eligible facility during the
quarter. (State of North Dakota, 2007)
The legislation also limits subsidy payments for no longer than a  10-year period and no
more than 10 million dollars total (State of North Dakota, 2007). Annual subsidy payments
are capped at $1.6 million.The legislation also created the Ethanol Production Incentive
Fund for the subsidy program.
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3. THEORETICAL MODEL
This chapter develops a stochastic simulation model of a typical corn-based ethanol
plant. The model is used to evaluate the impact of the Ethanol Production lncentive and
whether it could be structured to be more effective at reducing the probability of plant
bankruptcy. The stochastic profit model includes all economic sources of revenue as well as
all fixed and variable costs from the production of ethanol.
With the high price volatility of inputs and outputs, it is difficult for ethanol producers to
generate a return on their investment. Ethanol producers must carefully manage their
margins in this sometimes adverse economic environment.  As the price of corn changes,
the subsidy payments made by the State of North Dakota also have fluctuated, and it is
important to measure the effect the varying levels of these payouts are having on local
ethanol producers. The standard net profit model for a  profit maximizing business is:
(1)  Jt = TR -TC
Where Jt is profit, TR is total revenue and TC is total cost. TR is comprised of quantity of
ethanol output multiplied by price, DDGS output multiplied  by price, and  revenue from
subsidy payments. Total cost consists of fixed costs, such as depreciation of equipment and
buildings, interest on borrowing, as well as variable costs, which are calculated by
multiplying the cost of producing a single unit by the total output.
3.1.         Production Function
To determine the impact of the current North Dakota state ethanol subsidy, a
production function will be used to model an average North Dakota ethanol plant. The costs
will be broken down into corn and miscellaneous inputs. This allows the impact of changing
corn and energy prices on an ethanol plant's total cost to be measured. Output will be
defined as ethanol and DDGS. A subsidy payment also will be included on the output side to
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account for the  North Dakota  Ethanol Production Incentive. The total subsidy payment is
the payment per gallon multiplied  by ethanol output, which is a function of corn and
miscellaneous inputs.  Ethanol revenue is price of ethanol multiplied  by ethanol output. f.(x)
is composed of both positive and  negative variables.
The marginal  rate of substitution is zero because the analysis assumes a fixed
proportion  production function.  In this case, each unit of output requires a specific amount
of each input, which leaves changing the level of output as the only method of adjusting to
changes in cost of inputs.
We can now set up the profit function as shown below:
(2)  Jt =  P| f(Xi,  X2 I   Xi)+P2 8(Xi,  X2 I   Xi)+Si f(Xi,  X2 I  Xi) -Xiw|-X2W2
Where:
71 is annual  profit in dollars for a  50-million-gallon  per year ethanol  plant
Pi is the price of ethanol in dollars per gallon
P2 is the price of DDGS in dollars per ton
Si is the ethanol subsidy payment in dollars per gallon
f(Xi, x2 I   xi)represents the quantity of ethanol output per gallon as a function of inputs
Xi and  X2(given Xi)
g(xi, x2 I   xi) represents the quantity of DDGS output per ton as a function of input xi and
x2(given xi)
xi is the quantity of corn in bushels
wi is the price of corn in dollars per bushel
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x2 is the quantity of miscellaneous inputs per gallon of ethanol produced
w2 is the dollar value of miscellaneous inputs per gallon of ethanol produced
First Order Conditions
Taking the derivative of the profit function with respect to xi (quantity of corn) provides
the marginal physical  product of corn by employing one more unit of input as shown in
Equation 3.
(3, =1 -- 0  ®  sl
Let  /xl -
df(Xi,X2lxi)
dxl
= W1   -  P1
C!f(Xi,X2|ri)            ~        _  Czg(Xi,X2|Xi)
gx1=dxi                 U^+                dxi
(4) #-0  ®  sl -± -P1-P2#
Czf(Xi,#2|Xi)        ._    dg(Xi,X2|Xi)
dxi              I  i         dxi
To evaluate this expression, consider the sign of each individual term:
±L:  wi (corn  price) will be positive since corn prices are always greater than zero. fxi will be
positive as the firm will operate at the point on its production possibilities curve before
diminishing marginal returns. Since both the numerator and denominator are positive, the
entire term  is positive.
-  Pi :  Pi (ethanol Price) will be negative with respect to Si. As ethanol price increases, the
subsidy payment will decrease which indicates an inverse relationship.
-P2=;i:P2(DDGSprice)willbenegativewithrespecttosiandasDDGSpriceincreases
the subsidy payment decreases, indicating an inverse relationship.   g(xi) and f(xi) will be
consistently negative as the firm will operate at the point on its production possibilities
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curve before diminishing marginal returns and with the negative sign  they both will have an
inverse relationship with subsidy payment.
The equation shows the direct relationship between the subsidy payment per gallon
and the price of corn.  The equation also shows an inverse relationship between subsidy
payment and price of ethanol and  DDGS.  However, whether f'(x) is positive or negative is
indeterminate because it is not known which absolute value is larger. As a  result, the impact
of the subsidy cannot be determined a priori.
Taking the derivative of the profit function with respect to x2 (quantity of miscellaneous
inputs) provides the marginal physical product of miscellaneous inputs by employing one
more unit of input as shown in Equation 5. Profit is comprised of revenue generated by
output of ethanol and DDGS,  minus the cost of miscellaneous inputs.  The equation shows a
direct relationship between miscellaneous inputs and output, where a change in cost of
miscellaneous inputs could change the optimal quantity of output.
(s, =2 -- 0  ®  sl
-et   f x2-
dJ(Xi,X2|X|)
dx2
= W2 -  P1
df(Xi,X2|Xi)           ~        _  dg(Xi,X2|Xi)
a x 2 _-dx2                     C' ^L.                    dx2
(6) # -0  -  s. -% -p.-p2%
CZJ(Xi,X2|Xi)         .A     dg(Xi,X2|X|)
dxz                  `-L            dx2
To evaluate this expression, consider the sign of each individual term:
±Z-:  w2 (cost of miscellaneous inputs will be positive since costs are always greater than
zero. fx2 will be positive as the firm will operate at the point on its production possibilities
curve before diminishing marginal returns. Since both the numerator and denominator are
positive, the entire term is positive.
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-Pi : Pi (ethanol price) will be negative with respect to Si. As ethanol price increases, the
subsidy payment will decrease, which indicates an inverse relationship.
-P2=;i:P2(DDGSprice)WillbenegativewithrespecttosiandasDDGSpriceincreases
the subsidy payment decreases, indicating an inverse relationship.   g(x2) and f(x2) will be
consistently negative as the firm will operate at the point on its production possibilities
curve before diminishing marginal returns. The negative sign indicates they both will have
an inverse relationship with subsidy payment.
Output is determined  by factors such as corn and ethanol prices. The difference in price
of the inputs and outputs in turn determine profitability. Miscellaneous inputs are a less
significant factor for profitability and  risk of bankruptcy because many miscellaneous inputs
are fixed or can change by only a small degree. With the relationship of f'(x) being
indeterminate, the actual effect cannot be determined a priori.
The first order conditions taken with respect to xi and x2 suggest that the total subsidy
payment has an impact in determining plant output as well as reducing risk in adverse
economic conditions. This follows the intent of the legislation, which is designed to increase
support as marginal cost rises and  marginal revenue falls. With respect to xi, as the gap
between marginal cost and  marginal revenue grows, the total subsidy payment will also
increase. This will boost marginal revenue and  lead to higher output and  profitability than
market conditions would otherwise dictate. Equation 7 below takes the derivative of the
profit function with respect to Si (ethanol subsidy payment per gallon of ethanol produced).
The result suggests that if the subsidy increases, ethanol production will increase as well.
(7)#=f(Xi,X2lxi)>0
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3.2.
The marginal rate of substitution is zero because the analysis used a fixed proportion
production function.  In this case, each unit of output requires a specific amount of each
input. ,
Industry Supply Curve
The industry supply curve will show the relationship between the price of ethanol and the
quantity supplied  by producers. This can be formulated by finding the individual supply
curves of the ethanol producers in North Dakota and then horizontal summing to determine
the industry supply curve. To find an individual producer's supply curve in the long run, the
marginal costs above the average total cost represents the firm's long-run supply curve
(average variable cost and average total cost being the same in the long-run). The sum of
the quantities all firms are willing to produce at a given price reveals the industry supply
curve, as shown in  Figure 3.1, where Si is supply without subsidy, S2 is supply with subsidy,
and  P is price, Q is quantity and  D is demand.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the subsidy shifts the supply curve from Si to S2. The amount
of the subsidy is shown by the vertical distance (P1 -P2).  The subsidy shifts the market
equilibrium price from  Pito P2 and the production equilibrium quantity from Qi to Q2
(Mccain,1998). The end  result is a  higher output quantity at a  lower price.
Figure 3.1.  Ethanol  Industry Supply Curve.
Sources:   (Mccain, 1998)
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4. DATA SOURCES, METHODS AND SIMULATION PROCEDURES
A model was developed in the previous chapter to evaluate the impact of subsidy on the
profitability of ethanol  production (Equation 2).   Using this model, the effect of the ethanol
production subsidy can  be examined and ways to improve it can be explored.  In this
chapter, an empirical Monte Carlo simulation model is developed, tested and evaluated
with monthly corn and ethanol price data. The model is a spreadsheet designed to
stochastically evaluate plant profitability with and without the Ethanol Production Incentive.
The model also tests two alternative structures for the Ethanol Production Incentive. The
stochastic element simulates corn and ethanol prices and uses survey data for the fixed
costs of production.  BestFit (Palisade Corporation, 2009) is used to fit the corn and ethanol
distributions using the Anderson-Darling (A-D),  Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and  Chi-square
(C-S) tests. The forecast prices are then used to project plant profitability, profitability with
the Ethanol Production Incentive and  profitability with the alternative subsidy structures.
Stand alone plant rate of return on equity and probability of bankruptcy are calculated. The
analysis compares the impact of different subsidies on plant rate of return on equity and
probability of bankruptcy.
To determine the impact of the Ethanol Production Incentive on  plant risk of
bankruptcy, the outcome for two hypotheses is simulated.  The null hypothesis is that the
state ethanol subsidy will have no impact on plant risk of bankruptcy. The alternative
hypothesis is that the state subsidy does have an impact on plant risk of bankruptcy.
4.1.        AnalyticalModel
The empirical model developed in this chapter is based on Monte Carol simulation and
tests the theoretical constructs proposed in the previous chapter.  "Monte Carlo simulation
is a computerized mathematical technique that allows people to account for risk in
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quantitative analysis and decision making"  (Palisade Corporation, 2009). Plant profitability is
simulated with a stochastic model using the  Monte Carlo method.  Historical data sets are
used to generate probability distributions for corn and ethanol prices, which are then used
to model future values. This was done in an Excel spreadsheet that was first set up to
calculate plant income using historical data. When completed, dynamic and static variables
are defined.  Dynamic variables in the simulation are defined as corn price and ethanol price.
These variables were selected  both for their importance to plant profitability as well as for
their significance in calculating the Ethanol Production  Incentive payment. All other
variables are left static because of their lesser impact on plant profitability and the dramatic
increase in model complexity that would result by making all variables dynamic. Static
variables include price of DDGS, cost of electricity, natural gas, additional natural gas drying
for 60% of DDGS,  labor and management. All of the simulations are before interest and
taxes.
4.2.        Data sources
This section describes the sources of data used to calibrate the simulation model.
Several sources of data are available, including Hofstrand  (2008) and  EIlinger (2007) but
ultimately data from a study investigating the efficiency of Midwest ethanol plants (Perrin,
Fretes, & Sesmero, 2008) were selected. The study by EIlinger offers greater detail for plant
operational cost data: it projects the balance sheet of plant finances for several years and
includes details such as income per bushel of corn consumed and income per gallon of
ethanol produced. Furthermore, the study includes the predicted breakeven prices of
ethanol and corn. However, the data are highly dependent on assumptions such as plant
size (loo million gallons),  per gallon total building cost at $1.80 per gallon, 50% equity
financing, and a sweep factor of 25%. Another study by Hofstrand at Iowa State University
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also was considered, which calculates returns per gallon of ethanol produced, as well as
profitability,  revenue and costs.  Like  EIIinger, this study calculates the breakeven point for
corn and ethanol price. However, the study is dependent on assumptions such as year built
(2007), specific capacity (100 million gallons), 50% lender financing, a  plant operating at 120
percent of nameplate capacity, and input costs typical for an  Iowa corn ethanol facility.
Both of these studies attempt to model the profitability of one ethanol plant in a
specific geographic area, with the former study based on a  plant in  Illinois and the latter
study focused on a plant in Iowa. Inputs and costs of both locations vary from that of North
Dakota. In Perrin's study, seven dry-grind ethanol plants throughout the Midwest were
surveyed. None of the plants were in North Dakota; however, the averages of the data
taken are more likely to reduce error. The studies by Hofstrand and  EIlinger both  model a
single plant in a single state, versus Perrin's study that uses data from Iowa,  Michigan,
Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska, South  Dakota and Wisconsin (see Table 4.1). Another
advantage of Perrin's study that should  be emphasized is that it uses actual survey data,
versus the other studies, which were more dependent on assumptions and projected
figures.  The survey period for Perrin's study began in the third quarter of 2006 and  lasted
until the fourth quarter of 2007 (six consecutive quarters).
Table 4.1.  Ethanol  Plant Costs.
Sources: i;;riirji6o8j; Hofstrand (2008), and EIIinger (2007)
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The goal of Perrin's study was to estimate the cost function of a representative Midwest
ethanol plant.   Both variable and fixed costs were estimated. A critical measure of ethanol
plant performance is corn cost per gallon of ethanol produced.
Perrin's study found corn costs to be 93 cents per gallon.  Ellinger provided a seven-year
projection with a combined energy (thermal and electric) cost of 37 cents per gallon.   Perrin
also factored in cost of additional natural gas for drying 60% of DDGS at 12 cents per gallon
of ethanol produced.  Neither Ellinger nor Hoftstrand had a separate figure for this factor.
Table 4.2 contains the costs and the figures used  in calculating the subsidy.
The payment threshold is specified in state legislation: When the price per bushel of
corn is over $1.80, the state will pay one-tenth of a cent for each cent over the threshold.
The deduction threshold is specified as follows: When the price per gallon of ethanol is over
$1.30, the state will deduct from the payment two-tenths of a cent for each cent over the
threshold.
Representative fixed costs were not surveyed in Perrin's study; however, it included a
combined estimated cost of 35 cents per gallon for interest and depreciation.  These were
higher than either Hofstrand or EIlinger's studies indicated, as shown in Table 4.3. The
Midwest ethanol plants surveyed  produced 2.86 gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn. They
also produced 14.9 pounds of DDGS per bushel of corn.  Using the aforementioned statistics,
the cost per gallon of ethanol can be calculated along with plant profit or loss per gallon.
The ethanol production incentive also is factored in separately to show the difference
between plant profit with and without subsidy.
In years with net losses, both the net loss and  principle payment reduce plant equity.
Principle payments were calculated  using the principle payment function in Excel.  Inputs
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Table 4.2. Total Plant Costs.
Feedstock
Ethanol  per bu of Corn (gal/bu)
torn ne eded for production
Depreciation and Interest
17,421,60
otal Miscellaneous Input Costs
Sources:  Perrin (2008)
Table 4 Interest and  Depreciation Costs.
Sources:   Perrin (2008),  Hofstrand (2008), and Ellinger (2007)
used included the interest rate on debt (15%), period (annual),  nper (15), and annual loan
balance ($45 million). Total equity was calculated by adding annual net income to starting
equity.
In the simulation, miscellaneous costs are static while costs of corn and  price of ethanol
are dynamic. Costs were calculated on a per gallon basis and categorized as the cost of corn
and miscellaneous costs. Cost of corn per gallon was calculated using a cost function
coefficient (Perrin,  Fretes, & Sesmero, 2008). Miscellaneous costs per gallon include
electricity, natural gas, drying for 60% of DDGS, labor and management, and other
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4.3.
expenses, as shown in Table 4.2.   Revenue is comprised of ethanol price, DDGS sales, plus
the subsidy payment, if applicable.
Operating cost less interest and taxes was calculated by multiplying operating cost per
gallon by total plant capacity. Mean operating costs were $1.24 per gallon, which compares
with $1.29 per gallon from Perrin et. al. (2008), 97 cents per gallon from Shapouri and
Gallagher (2008), 92 cents from  Kwiatkowski and  MCAloon (2006), and $1.31 from  Eidman
(2007). Interest was calculated  using the interest payment function in Excel. Total operating
cost was calculated by taking the sum of operating cost less interest and taxes.
The rate of return on equity was calculated by dividing net income by average equity
(Brigham, Gapenski, & Ehrhardt,1999).  Rate of return on equity was calculated for ten years
and then the average was taken for the lo-year average rate of return on equity. Plant
equity was examined to determine the 10-year average rate of return on equity for the
plant, as well as to evaluate the possibility of bankruptcy.
Risk of bankruptcy was calculated each year for 10 years.  If equity was positive, the
spreadsheet cell value was zero, meaning not bankrupt. If equity was negative, the
spreadsheet cell value was one for bankruptcy.  Negative equity automatically reset equity
the next year back to starting equity and assumes new ownership. The lo-year risk of
bankruptcy was calculated by taking the mean of the risk of bankruptcy cells for all 10 years.
This was done to show the percent chance of plant bankruptcy, both with and without the
different subsidies.
Price Data
Corn price data were obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS),
which conducts agricultural market research and collects agricultural statistics for the
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United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Ethanol price data were obtained from the
Nebraska  Energy Office. The Nebraska Ethanol  Board supplied the ethanol price data.
Corn price was simulated with monthly data from January 1988 to December 2008
(United States Department of Agriculture, 2007). The mean price of corn was $2.32 per
bushel with a standard deviation of 72 cents per bushel. The median price was $2.17 per
bushel. The highest price was $6.33 per bushel while the lowest price was $1.46 per bushel.
Price data were used from the USDA source (through NASS) for North Dakota. The data, as
graphed below in Figure 4.1, show the average corn price over the past 20 years.
Figure 4.1. Annual Corn  Price  Data.
Source:  NASS, USDA
From 2005 to 2008, the price of corn in the United States more than doubled.  There are
many factors that are pushing prices higher. Some of the major factors include the increased
demand for corn used in ethanol production, reduced global supplies from poor harvests,
the low value of the dollar, increased consumption by emerging economies, and higher
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input costs (Capehart & Richardson, 2008). With the rising corn prices, ethanol  producers
have been impacted significantly as their input costs have increased dramatically. While the
size of the recent price spike is unusual, it is important to include it in the study, as price
spikes in the future are possible. As the world population continues to grow and the amount
of arable land decreases, it is likely that there will  be more surges in demand in the future.
According to a study by Mcphail & Babcock (2008), the expansion of ethanol  production will
increase the prices of corn. More recently, however, corn prices have eased back to
historical  prices.
Ethanol  price was simulated using ethanol price monthly data, as shown in Figure 4.2
below, were used from January 1988 to December 2008 (Nebraska Energy Office, 2009). The
mean price of ethanol was $1.45  per gallon with a standard deviation of 49 cents per gallon.
The median price was $1.26 per gallon and the highest price was $3.58 per gallon, while the
lowest price was 90 cents per gallon.
Figure 4.2. Annual  Ethanol  Price Data.
Source: Nebraska Energy Off.Ice
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Since 2002, ethanol prices have steadily increased.  Federal legislation such as the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Renewable Fuel Standard  Program of 2006, and the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 all boosted demand for renewable fuels. At the
same time, gas prices, which are positively correlated with ethanol prices at the national
level, have experienced a dramatic increase, making ethanol more attractive as an
alternative and leading to higher demand and  higher prices.  More recently, as the price of
gasoline has retreated so has the price of ethanol, with both falling to levels closer to 2005
prices. The data are collected  in  Nebraska, and while Nebraska  rack prices will not be
identical to that of North  Dakota, local historical data does not exist due to the relatively
late beginning and small scale of the ethanol industry in  North Dakota.
4.4.         Data Distribution
The model was designed to show the effect that the Ethanol Production Incentive has
on plant rate of return on equity and plant shutdown point. The model was then used to
explore ways the subsidy could be changed to be more effective. The data distributions
were used by @Risk (Palisade Corporation, 2009)to   predict future prices. Using the
production function developed earlier with survey data from  Perrin's study, it is possible to
model ethanol plant return on equity, subsidy payments and  risk of bankruptcy. Using
monthly data from January 1988 to December 2008, @Risk was used to test each set of data
for the best distributional fit using the Chi-squared (C-S), Anderson-Darling (A-D), and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. Once the best distributional fits were found for both corn
and ethanol, they were used to forecast prices.
The Risk Loglogistic distribution fitted the corn prices with the A-D, and  K-S distribution
statistics.  Risk Loglogistic was fitted first with A-D and  K-S, and a close second in C-S. This
was done using the BestFit distribution (Palisade Corporation, 2009). The A-D and  K-S
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distributions are more applicable to continuous data, whereas C-S was derived to test
binned data. As a  result, the Loglogistic density function was chosen to model the
distribution of corn  prices.  Loglogistic parameters are defined  by gamma, beta, and alpha,
which are the location parameter, shape parameter, and scale parameter, respectively. For
Loglogistic corn  price, the gamma was 1.30, beta was .84, and alpha was 2.92. The p-value
was .1704.
The Risk Loglogistic distribution fitted the ethanol prices with the A-D and  K-S
distribution statistics. Risk Loglogistic was fitted first with A-D and  K-S, and a close second in
C-S using BestFit Distribution (Palisade Corporation, 2009).   As a  result of the distributional
fit tests, Risk Loglogistic was chosen to simulate ethanol price.  For Loglogistic ethanol price,
the gamma was .89,  beta was .41, and alpha was 2.21. The p-value for ethanol price was
•0001.
The shapes of the two distributions are similar; both are skewed towards the left with
tails unbound to the right. On the national level there is strong evidence that corn and
ethanol prices are correlated.  Using the historical corn and ethanol prices, a correlation
coefficient of .41 was imposed on the simulated  prices.
4.5.        Alternative subsidy structures and sensitivities
Along with examining the current Ethanol Production  Incentive, the model also was
used to test two alternative structures for the subsidy to determine if the changes would
improve the subsidy's effectiveness.
One alternative subsidy is to base the payment on the historical price margin between
corn and ethanol.  Using the historical data collected earlier, the average margin between
corn price per bushel and ethanol price per gallon was calculated at 87 cents. This was set as
the new payment threshold and kept the one-tenth of a cent payment for each cent over
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the set price. The subsidy deduction was eliminated; all other aspects of the subsidy (time
limit, payment limits) were left unchanged.  In the study, this is referred to as the margin
subsidy.
The second alternative subsidy takes the rolling average of the most recent three years
of corn and ethanol prices and uses the average as the subsidy thresholds for payments and
deductions. The subsidy payment was increased to one-half cent for each cent over the
threshold in order for the subsidy to have a significant impact. All other aspects of the
subsidy were unchanged. In the study, this is referred to as the three-year rolling average
subsidy.
The sensitivities used  DDGS as a dynamic variable, which was applied to the base model
and the three-year rolling average alternative subsidy model. This variable was made
dynamic to improve the accuracy of the simulation.
4.6.         Statistical significance
The following formulas are used to prove that the results of the different subsidy
structures are statistically significant from the base mode (Mendenhall, Beaver, & Beaver,
Introduction to Probability and Statistics, 2006):
Ho : Any difference is due to random error.
Ha :  Difference is a result of systemic differences.
To find the total sample variance (s2), the number of observations in the base model
minus one is multiplied  by base model population variance.  This is repeated for the subsidy
model and the two calculated figures are summed. The summed total is then divided by
base model observations plus subsidy model observations minus two.
s2 =   dyLfr_Lfu_Life_2
N1 +  N2 -2
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To find the calculated t-value for statistical significance, the average risk of bankruptcy
in the base model is found and then subtracted from the average risk of bankruptcy in the
subsidy model. The calculated figure is then divided by the square root of sample variance
multiplied by one divided the number of base model observations plus one divided  by
subsidy model observations.
t=      JE_life_
v(s2(i+±,,
Where:
Ni is number of observations from the base model
N2 is number of observations from the subsidy model
o] 2 is the population variance of the base model
o22 is the population variance of the subsidy model
Ei is the average risk of bankruptcy of the base model
€52 is the average risk of bankruptcy of the subsidy model
s2 is the total sample variance
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5.  RESULTS AND SENSITIVITIES
Results of the stochastic simulation model developed to evaluate  North Dakota's
ethanol production incentive are presented in this chapter.  The model simulates plant
profit per gallon with and without the  North Dakota Ethanol Production Incentive. The
simulation was run for 10,000 iterations in @Risk. The rate of return on equity for a 50-
million-gallon per year ethanol plant was determined with and without the ethanol
production incentive in the context of both risky input and output prices to determine the
impact of the ethanol production incentive on plant viability.  In summary, the incentive was
found to decrease plant vulnerability to high market prices of corn. The subsidy
accomplished this by increasing support when the price of corn was high and decreasing
support as ethanol price increased.  Finally, alternative subsidy structures were examined
that provide greater financial assistance to plants while minimizing public sector burden.
5.1.        Chapter overview
The base rate of return on equity for the simulated ethanol plant is 6.41%, as shown
below in Table 5.1. In the base model, mean prices paid for corn and  received for ethanol
are $2.29 per bushel and $1.44 per gallon, respectively.  These prices were randomly drawn
from Loglogistic distributions using historical data.   Results of this statistical estimation are
presented in section 5.2.
The rate of return with the Ethanol Production Incentive increases to -0.04% (Table 5.1).
The Ethanol Production Incentive is presented in section 5.3.  Then, margin based subsidy is
Table 5.1. Simulated  Ethanol  Plant's  Return on  Equity.
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tested and  presented  in section 5.4. The three-year rolling average subsidy is presented in
section 5.5.
5.2.         Ethanol plant simulation: Base Model
This section discusses the base model that includes forecast prices for corn and ethanol,
as well as the forecast for net income, the rate of return on equity, and the probability of
bankruptcy for an  unsubsidized ethanol plant.
5.2.1.Corn price forecast. Corn prices in the base model were based on USDA data
collected from  1988 through 2008.  @risk calculated the BestFit simulated distribution as
RiskLoglogistic (1.29, 0.835, 2.91), shown  in  Figure 5.1.   At a 90% probability, corn  price is
expected to fall in a  range from $1.61 per bushel to $3.54 per bushel, with a  mean price of
$2.29 per bushel. The minimum and  maximum expected  prices were $1.32 per bushel and
$7.97 per bushel with a standard deviation of 68 cents per bushel.   Perrin's projected corn
price was $3.04, and studies by Shapouri and  Kwiatkowski estimated corn price at $2.23 and
$2.20,  respectively. The distribution is positively skewed and  unbound to the right, which
implies higher prices are increasingly unlikely. A correlation of .45 was found  between
historical corn and ethanol prices and was imposed on the probability distributions for both.
Potential price spikes could be caused by infrequent events, such as unfavorable growing
conditions and crop failures.   In  most years though, prevailing prices hover around the mean
closest to the left-hand side of the distribution. This implies that ethanol plants can plan
under normal circumstances for corn prices to fall inside the expected  price range, which
can be used to estimate the future cost of corn, as well as subsidy payments.
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Figure 5.1. Corn  Price  Probability Distribution.
5.2.2. Ethanol price forecast. Ethanol prices in the base model were based on 1988-
2008 data from the Nebraska  Energy Office.   @risk calculated the BestFit simulated
distribution as RiskLoglogistic (0.88, 0.41, 2.21), shown below. At 90% probability, ethanol
price is expected to fall in a range from 99 cents per gallon to $2.37 per gallon, with a  mean
price of $1.44 per gallon. The minimum and  maximum expected prices are 88 cents per
gallon and $5.37 per gallon with a standard deviation of 51 cents per gallon.  Figure 5.2
shows the distribution is positively skewed and unbound to the right, which implies higher
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Figure 5.2.  Ethanol  Price  Probability Distribution.
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prices are increasingly unlikely. In most years though,  prevailing prices hover around the
mean closer to the left-hand side of the distribution. This implies that under normal
circumstances ethanol plants can plan for ethanol prices to fall within the expected  range,
which can be used to estimate future revenue and subsidy payments.
5.2.3. Net income forecast. The net income distribution showed expected plant income
at 90% of probability falling at a range of -$22,600,000 to $42,800,000 with a mean of
$1,277,668. The minimum and maximum expected income is projected at -$110,470,542
and $193,080,398 with a standard deviation of $23,632,561. Net income is before interest
and taxes.   Perrin's study had plant return over operating cost at $33,150,000 (taking return
over operating costs per gallon times 50 million gallons). The net income distribution, shown
in Figure 5.3, follows the corn and ethanol price distributions as positively skewed and
unbound.  In the same way, the tails also reflect this with  most scenarios showing net
income hovering near the mean at the left-hand side of the distribution and with the
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Figure 5.3.  Net Income Distribution.
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outlying levels of income increasingly unlikely.  The tails of the net income distribution
reflect the influence corn and ethanol price have on net income, with the tails of the net
income distribution similar to that of corn and ethanol.
5.2.4.  Rate of return on equity forecast. The rate of return on equity was calculated by
taking the net income and dividing by average equity (Brigham, Gapenski, & Ehrhardt,
1999). The rate of return on equity distribution shows the expected rate of return at 90%
probability, falling from -67% to 64.5% (Figure 5.4). The minimum and maximum rates of
return are projected at -254.79% and 136.41% with a standard deviation of 40.82%. The
mean rate of return is -6.41%.
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Figure 5.4. Rate of Return Distribution.
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5.2.5. Ten-year rate of return on equity forecast. The ten-year rate of return on equity
was calculated by taking the net income and dividing by the average equity (Brigham,
Gapenski, & Ehrhardt,1999). The rate of return on equity distribution shows the expected
rate of return at 90% probability falling from -.2% to 0% (Figure 5.5). The minimum and
maximum rate of return are projected from -1981.46% and .3456% with a standard
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deviation of 26.11%. The mean rate of return is -1.26%. The lo-year rate of return is a
measurement to show the return an investor could expect on investment. Taken along with
risk of bankruptcy, it shows the level of investor risk versus expected return.
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Figure 5.5. Ten-Year Average Rate of Return Distribution.
5.2.6. Risk of bankruptcy.  In the simulation, bankruptcy occurs when equity reaches
zero. If bankruptcy occurs, the next year begins with equity at $45,000,000 (original starting
equity) and assumes a new owner purchases the plant. The risk of bankruptcy is determined
by taking the average of the number of times equity reaches zero over ten years (Figure
5.6). At 90% probability, the risk of bankruptcy falls between 00/o and 50%, with a mean
probability of 10.64%.  The standard deviation is 14.760/o.
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Figure 5.6.  Risk of Bankruptcy Distribution.
5.3.         Ethanol plant simulation: Ethanol production Incentive Model
This section covers the Ethanol  Production Incentive model using the same results for
corn and ethanol  prices.  It includes the subsidy payment per gallon, net income with subsidy
payment, and rate of return with the subsidy.
5.3.1. Ethanol production incentive subsidy payment per gallon forecast. The total
Ethanol Production  Incentive payment (per gallon) was calculated  using the forecast corn
and ethanol prices. At 90% probability, the subsidy payment is expected to fall in a  range of
zero cents per gallon to 17.4 cents per gallon, with a  mean  payment of 5.17 cents per gallon
(Figure 5.7). The minimum and maximum expected  payments are zero cents per gallon and
61.78 cents per gallon, with a standard deviation of 6.54 cents per gallon.
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Figure 5.7.  EPI Subsidy Payment per Gallon  Distribution.
5.3.2. Total ethanol production incentive payment forecast. The total subsidy payment
to the plant was calculated by multiplying the subsidy payment per gallon by plant capacity.
At 90% probability, the subsidy payment falls in a range of $0 to $1.6 million with a mean
payment of $718,941 per firm and a standard deviation of $718,094 (Figure 5.8). The
subsidy payment softens the impact of downturns when there are high corn prices and low
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Figure 5.8.  EPI Subsidy Payment Distribution.
40
ethanol prices, decreasing the size of the losses incurred. The subsidy appears to
moderately improve an ethanol plant's ability to weather downturns.
5.3.3. Net Income with ethanol production incentive forecast. Net income with subsidy
was calculated by adding net income with subsidy payment. The net income with subsidy
distribution shows expected plant income at 90% of probability, falling in a  range of -
$21,000,000 to $42,800,000 with a mean of $1,996,609 (Figure 5.9). The minimum and
maximum expected income is projected at -$108,870,542 and $193,080,398, with a
standard deviation of $23,254,606. The distribution is positively skewed and unbound. The
subsidy increased the left parameter by $1,600,000 and increased the mean level of income.
This shows the subsidy's impact on increasing overall plant net income.
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Figure 5.9.  Net Income with  EPI  Distribution.
5.3.4. Rate of return on equity with ethanol production incentive forecast. The rate of
return distribution shows the expected rate of return at 90% probability, falling from -60.8%
to 64.5% with a standard deviation of 39.17% (Figure 5.10). The mean rate of return was
-.040/o.
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Figure 5.10.  Rate of Return with  EPI  Distribution.
5.3.5. Ten-year rate of return with ethanol production incentive forecast. The rate of
return distribution shows the expected rate of return at 90% probability, falling from -270%
to 20% with a standard deviation of 38.70% (Figure 5.11). The mean rate of return is given
as -.92%.
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Figure 5.11. Ten-Year Average Rate of Return with EPI  Distribution.
5.3.6. Risk of bankruptcy with ethanol production incentive. The risk of bankruptcy is
determined by taking the average of the number of times equity reaches zero over 10 years.
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At 90% probability, the risk of bankruptcy falls between 0% and 40%, with a mean
probability of 10.08% and a standard deviation of 14.29% (Figure 5.12). The ethanol
production incentive reduces risk of bankruptcy by .56%.
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Figure 5.12.  Risk of Bankruptcy with  EPI  Distribution
5.4.         Ethanol plant simulation: Margin subsidy
An alternative structure for the ethanol subsidy was created and tested.  The new
scheme was based on the margin between the average price spread of corn and ethanol
from the last 20 years to determine the subsidy payment threshold. The calculated average
margin between corn and ethanol price was 87 cents. Payments are made when the price of
corn increases to create a price spread greater than 87 cents. The payment per one cent
over the threshold for corn price was left at one-tenth of a cent. The deduction for ethanol
price was removed. This alternative structure was examined to determine if the ethanol
subsidy could be administered more efficiently and thus reduce taxpayer cost.
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5.4.1. Margin subsidy payment per gallon forecast. The total margin subsidy payment
per gallon was calculated  using the forecast corn and ethanol prices. At 90% probability, the
subsidy payment under the margin scheme is expected to range from zero cents per gallon
to 10.8 cents per gallon, with a mean payment of two cents per gallon (Figure 5.13). The
minimum and maximum expected payments are zero cents per gallon and 59 cents per
gallon, with a standard deviation of 4.6 cents per gallon.
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Figure 5.13.  Margin Subsidy Payment per Gallon  Distribution
5.4.2. Total margin subsidy payment forecast. The total margin subsidy payment was
calculated  by multiplying the subsidy payment per gallon by plant capacity. At 90%
probability, the margin average subsidy payment is expected to range from zero dollars to
$1,600,000, with a mean payment of $487,894 and a standard deviation of $668,180 (Figure
5.14). The margin average subsidy payment softens the impact of downturns when there
are high corn prices and low ethanol prices, decreasing the losses incurred. The margin
subsidy appears to moderately increase an ethanol plant's ability to weather downturns but
to a lesser extent than the Epl. The margin average subsidy has less of an impact but has a
correspondingly lower cost as well.
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Figure 5.14. Total Subsidy Payment with Margin Subsidy Distribution
5.4.3. Net income with margin subsidy forecast. Net income with margin subsidy was
calculated  by adding net income with subsidy payment. The net income with margin subsidy
distribution shows expected  plant income at 90% probability of falling within a range of -
$21,000,000 to $42,900,000, with a mean of $1,765,563 (Figure 5.15). The minimum and
maximum expected incomes are proj.ected at -$108,870,542 and $193,080,398, with a
standard deviation of $23,346,001. The distribution is positively skewed and  unbound. The
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Figure 5.15.  Net Income with  Margin Subsidy Distribution.
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margin average subsidy increased the left parameter by $1,600,000 and increased the mean
level of income. This indicates the margin subsidy has a  positive effect on plant net income.
5.4.4. Rate of return on equity with margin subsidy forecast. The margin subsidy rate of
return distribution shows the expected rate of return at 90% probability, ranging from -
60.8% to 64.5% (Figure 5.16). The minimum and maximum rates of return are  projected at -
241% and 136.41%, with a standard deviation of 39.34%. The mean rate of return is -4.91%.
This is an improvement over the unsubsidized rate of return but not a large enough change
to generate a positive rate of return.
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Figure 5.16.  Rate of Return with  Margin Subsidy Distribution.
5.4.5. Ten-year rate of return on equity with margin subsidy forecast.  The margin
subsidy 10-year rate of return distribution shows the expected rate of return at 90%
probability, ranging from -270% to 20% (Figure 5.17). The minimum and maximum rate of
return are projected at -409.92% and .3456%, with a standard deviation of 8.53%. The mean
rate of return is -.98%. This is a 28°/o improvement over the unsubsidized rate of return.
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Figure 5.17. Ten-Year Average Rate of Return with Margin Subsidy Distribution.
5.4.6. Risk of bankruptey with margin subsidy. The risk of bankruptcy is determined by
taking the average of the number of times equity reaches zero over 10 years. At 90%
probability, the probability of bankruptcy falls between 0% and 40°/o, with a mean
probability of 10.20% (Figure 5.18).  The minimum and maximum probabilities are 0%
andl00% with a standard deviation of 14.31%. The margin subsidy reduces probability of
bankruptcy by .42%.
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Figure 5.18.  Risk of Bankruptcy with  Margin Subsidy Distribution.
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5.5.         Ethanol plant simulation: Three-Year Rolling Average subsidy.
A second alternative structure for the ethanol subsidy was tested using the average
price of corn and ethanol from the previous three years to find the threshold for the
average subsidy payment. The payment per one cent over the threshold for corn price was
changed to one-half a cent from one-tenth of a cent in order to have significant results. The
deduction per one cent over the threshold for ethanol price was unchanged at two-tenths
of a cent. The alternative structure was used to change the subsidy threshold to reflect
current prices.
5.5.1. Three-year rolling average subsidy payment per gallon forecast. The total three-
year rolling average subsidy payment per gallon was calculated  using the forecast corn and
ethanol prices. At 90°/o probability, the three-year rolling average subsidy payment is
expected to fall in a range of zero cents per gallon to 13.7 cents per gallon, with a  mean
payment of three cents per gallon (Figure 5.19). The minimum and maximum expected
payments are zero cents per gallon and $2.35 per gallon, with a standard deviation of 16
cents per gallon.
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Figure 5.19. Three-Year Rolling Average Subsidy Payment per Gallon  Distribution.
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5.5.2. Total three-year rolling average subsidy payment forecast. The total three-year
rolling average subsidy payment was calculated  by multiplying the subsidy payment per
gallon by plant capacity. At 90% probability, the three-year rolling average subsidy payment
is expected to fall in a range of $0 to $1,600,000, with a mean payment of $107,384 (Figure
5.20). The minimum and maximum expected payments are $0 and $1,600,000, with a
standard deviation of $397,671. The subsidy payment may increase an ethanol plant's
ability to weather downturns but the impact would be far less than the other subsidy
structures tested. Compared to the other subsidies, the relatively small three-year rolling
average payment would  have a near negligible effect on net income, which would  result in a
negligible effect on risk of bankruptcy.
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Figure 5.20. Three-Year Rolling Average Subsidy Payment Distribution.
5.5.3. Net income with three-year rolling average subsidy forecast. Net income with
the three-year rolling average subsidy was calculated by taking net income and adding it to
the subsidy payment. The net income with three-year rolling average subsidy distribution
shows expected plant income at 900/o of probability, falling at a range of -$22,000,000 to
$42,900,000, with a mean of $1,385,053 (Figure 5.21). The minimum and maximum
expected incomes are projected at $108,870,542 and $193,080,398, with a standard
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deviation of$23,582,909. The distribution is positively skewed and unbound. The subsidy
increased the mean level of income but did not affect the left parameter. This shows the
relatively minor impact the subsidy has on plant's net income.
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Figure 5.21.  Net  Income with Three-Year Rolling Average Subsidy Distribution.
5.5.4. Rate of return on equity with three-year rolling average subsidy forecast. The
three-year rolling average rate of return on equity distribution shows the expected rate of
return at 90% probability, falling from -65.20/o to 64.5% (Figure 5.22). The minimum and
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Figure 5.22.  Rate of Return with Three-Year Rolling Average Subsidy Distribution.
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maximum rates of return are projected at -241.93% and 136.41%, with a standard deviation
of 40.310/o. The mean rate of return on equity was -6.080/o.
5.5.5. Ten-year rate of return with three-year rolling average subsidy forecast. The
three-year rolling average rate of return on equity distribution shows the expected rate of
return at 90% probability, falling from -.003% to 0% (Figure 5.23). The minimum and
maximum rates of return are projected at -1981.46% and .34°/o, with a standard deviation of
26.09%. The mean rate of return on equity was 1.26%.
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Figure 5.23. Ten-Year Average  Rate of Return with Three-Year
Rolling Average Subsidy Distribution.
5.5.6. Risk of bankruptcy with three-year rolling average subsidy. The risk of
bankruptcy is determined by taking the average of the number of times equity reaches zero
over 10 years. At 90% probability, the risk of bankruptcy falls between 0% and 40%, with a
mean probability of 10.59% (Figure 5.24).  The minimum and maximum probabilities are 0%
and  100%, with a standard deviation of 14.64%. The three-year rolling average subsidy
reduces probability of bankruptcy by .05%.
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Figure 5.24.  Risk of Bankrupcty with Three-Year Rolling Average Subsidy.
5.6.        Summary and sensitivities
The base model results show negative returns with or without the subsidy (Table 5.2).
The  DDGS sensitivity shows the impact of adding DDGS as a stochastic variable in the base
model and in the 2006 through 2008 sensitivity (Table 5.3). The 2006 through 2008
sensitivity table shows the relatively insignificant impact the subsidies have when there are
favorable market conditions (Table 5.4). The information in Table 5.2  is from figures in
Appendix A. Information in Table 5.3 is from figures in Appendix a.  Information for Table 5.4
is from figures in Appendix C.
Table 5.2.  Base  Model  Results.
Rate of Return Ten-Year ROE Risk ofBankruptcy Cost of Subsidy
No Subsidy -6.410/o -126.12% 10.64% None
Current Epl -4.31% -92.76% 10.08% $718,491
Margin Subsidy -4.91% -98.32% 10.20% $487,894
Three-YearAverage -6.08% -126.20% 10.59o/o ?107,385
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Table  5.3.  DDGS Sensitivity.
Net Income Rate of Return Ten-YearROE Risk of Bankruptcy
Base Model $1,277,668 -1.32% 1.980/o 10.40%
2006-2008Data $3,145,059 0.05% 4.60% 8.450/o
Table 5.4. Sensitivity between 2006 and 2008.
Rate of Return Ten-Year ROE Risk ofBankruptcy Cost of Subsidy
No Subsidy 47.56% 3.36% 2.18% None
Current  EPI 48.43% 4.02% 2.07% ;365,203
Margin Subsidy 48.84% 4.05% 2.07% $669,187
Three-YearAverage 48.860/o 4.32% 2.07% $719,231
The results demonstrate the impact the Ethanol Production  Incentive has on plant
feasibility in North Dakota. The Ethanol Production Incentive, in its current form, generates
the best rate of return to ethanol plants of the three subsidies tested in the base model.
However, the margin-based subsidy also gives ethanol producers an improved rate of return
at a lower cost to the taxpayer and could be a considered a viable alternative.  The three-
year rolling average subsidy does not have a statistically insignificant impact.
The 2006 through 2008 sensitivity shows very different subsidy payouts and impact.  In
this sensitivity the Ethanol Production  Incentive is the lowest cost subsidy structure and  has
an insignificant impact on  risk of bankruptcy. The margin subsidy has a  much higher subsidy
payout but an insignificant impact on risk of bankruptcy. The three-year rolling average
subsidy has the highest payout, but again a very minor impact on bankruptcy. With the
improved economic conditions, ethanol plants should be receiving minimal assistance. The
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Ethanol Production Incentive has the smallest payout, although even so, the payout is likely
unnecessary and  has an extremely small impact.
5.7.         Statistical significance
A t-distribution is used to determine if the generated  results are significant from zero.
For each subsidy, S2 is calculated  by taking the base model variance squared and multiplying
it by number of observations minus one. This is then added to the subsidy model variance
squared, which is multiplied by number of observations minus one. The calculated number
is then divided by the combined observations of the base and subsidy models minus two.
The t-value is calculated by taking the lo-year average risk of bankruptcy for the base
model and subtracting the 10-year average risk of bankruptey of the subsidy. The calculated
number is then divided  by the square root of S2 times one divided by number of
observations of the base model plus one divided by number of observations from the
subsidy model. This gives the calculated t-value for each subsidy.
EPI Subsidy
S2 = (|0 -1 )(.1746)2 + (10 -1)(.1429)2
(10 + 10) -2
s2 =  (9)(.0305) + (9)(.0204)
18
s2 = .2745 + .1836
18
=  .0255
t = 10.64 -10.08
V(.0255(1/10 + 1/10))
t=      .56
.0714
= 7.8431            tut (99th percentile) = 3.25
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Reject Ho, the results are significant. This indicates that at the 99th percentile the results
are statistically significant from zero, showing the subsidy had a statistically significant
effect.
Margin Subsidy
S2 = (10 -1  )(.1746)2 + (10 -1)(.1431)2
(10 + 10) -2
S2 =  (9)(.0305) +  (9)(.0205)
18
s2 = .2745 + .1843
18
= .0255
t = 10.64 -10.20
V(.0255(1/10 + 1/10))
t=      .44
.0714
= 6.1625            tcrit (99th  percentile) = 3.25
Reject Ho, the results are significant. This indicates that at the 99th percentile the results
are statistically significant from zero, showing the subsidy had a statistically significant
effect.
Three-Year Average Subsidy
S2 =  (10 -1 )(.1746)2 + (10 -1)(.1464)2
(10 + 10) -2
S2 =  (9)(.0305)  + (9)(.0214)
18
s2 = .2745 + .1929
18
= .0260
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t = 10.64 - 10.59
V(.0260(1/10 + 1/10))
t=      .05
.0721
=.6935               tcut (99th percentile) =  1.38
Do not reject Ho, the results are not significant. This indicates that at the 99th percentile
the results are not statistically significant from zero, showing the subsidy did  not have a
statistically significa nt effect.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The ethanol industry in North Dakota faces continued exposure to variable market
prices of corn and ethanol. While corn prices have decreased from  record highs, the price
still remains volatile, as does the price of ethanol. The North Dakota state legislature
enacted the  Ethanol Production Incentive to improve survivability of ethanol plants faced
with  high corn  prices and low ethanol prices. A stochastic simulation of the current subsidies
was conducted to help the state of North Dakota determine how to structure its ethanol
support programs to minimize plant risk of bankruptcy.  In addition, two modifications of the
existing subsidy were evaluated to find the most effective means of implementation.
6.1.         Procedure
A stochastic model was developed using an ethanol plant production function to
simulate the impact of different ethanol subsidies on plant rate of return on equity and
plant risk of bankruptcy. The current Ethanol  Production  Incentive was tested first using the
parameters detailed by the state legislation. Then, alternative structures for the subsidy
were tested. The first alternative was a margin-based subsidy payment, which used the
historical average margin between the price of corn and ethanol and then compared it with
current price margins to determine the subsidy payment. The second alternative involved
updating the current Ethanol Production Incentive price thresholds for payments and
deductions to reflect current prices. Once the simulation was completed, the cost and
impact of each subsidy was compared to determine which would have the greatest impact
on risk of bankruptcy while minimizing costs.
The fixed and variable costs of production used in estimating plant costs were taken
from `'Efficiency in Midwest Corn Ethanol Plants" (Perrin,  Fretes, & Sesmero, 2008).  BestFit
was used to estimate distribution parameters using historical data. Data for corn prices from
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1988 through 2008 were taken from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service.  Data
for ethanol prices from 1988 to 2008 were taken from the Nebraska  Energy Office.
6.2.         Results
The stated purpose of the Ethanol Production  Incentive is to help new ethanol plants
preserve cash flows as price margins shrink. Without any subsidy, there was a  10.64%
chance of bankruptcy in the plant's first 10 years of operation in the base model. The
Ethanol Production  Incentive reduced the risk of bankruptcy by .56% or 5% of the total
probability of bankruptcy. The margin-based subsidy reduced the risk of bankruptcy by
lo.20°/o or 4% of the total probability of going bankrupt. The three-year rolling average
based subsidy reduced the risk of bankruptcy by 10.59% or 0.5% of the total risk of
bankruptcy. From the perspective of protecting ethanol plants during downturns, the
current Ethanol Production Incentive is the most effective method, followed closely by the
margin-based subsidy.
In the 2006 through 2008 sensitivity, the results change significantly. The risk of
bankruptcy without a subsidy drops to 2.18%, a significant decrease. The  Ethanol
Production Incentive reduces risk of bankruptcy to 2.07% or 5% of the total probability of
bankruptcy. The margin-subsidy reduces the risk of bankruptcy to 2.07% or 87% of the total
probability of bankruptcy. The three-year rolling average subsidy also has the same impact
with a much higher payout.  In this sensitivity, any subsidy should be minimizing or stopping
payouts, as the risk of bankruptcy is already extremely low.
The rate of return on equity was another measure used to find the impact of the
different support programs. The Ethanol Production Incentive improves plant rate of return
on equity over 32% from a return of -6.41% to -4.31%. The margin-based subsidy improves
the rate of return on equity to -4.91%. The three-year rolling average subsidy was the least
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effective, increasing rate of return on equity to -6.08%. From the rate of return on equity
standpoint, the Ethanol Production Incentive and  margin-based subsidy gave the greatest
improvement, while the three-year rolling average subsidy was not effective. Overall, the
three versions of the subsidy notably improve plant rate of return on equity.
In the 2006 through 2008 sensitivity, there is a major change in plant rate of return.
Without any subsidy, rate of return rises to 47.56%. The three subsidies increase rate of
return by around 1%, which has a limited effect on the much larger plant rate of return.
The cost of the ethanol support programs is another significant factor in determining
which program  is best for the State of North  Dakota. The current Ethanol Production
Incentive offers the greatest improvement in both rate of return on equity and probability
of bankruptcy, but it is also the most costly, with an average annual payment of $718,491.
The margin-based subsidy offers comparable results to the Ethanol Production  Incentive but
has a substantially lower annual cost of $487,894. The three-year rolling average based
subsidy had the least impact on rate of return on equity and  probability of bankruptcy, and,
correspondingly, cost the least with an annual payment of $107,385. From a cost
standpoint, the  Ethanol Production Incentive and margin-based subsidy are the most
expensive but also the most effective.
The 2006 through 2008 sensitivity shows the costs of the different subsidies
dramatically change. The Ethanol Production  Incentive had the lowest cost at $365,203,
while the margin subsidy payout increased to $669,187. The three-year average subsidy
payment I.umped to $719,231, giving it the greatest impact of the subsidies; however, it only
had a relatively minor impact overall.
Results indicate the Ethanol  Production  Incentive has a significant impact on plant rate
of return and that it reduces plant risk of bankruptcy. The margin-based subsidy had a  lesser
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impact on plant rate of return and risk of bankruptcy.  Overall, the Ethanol Production
Incentive subsidy produced the best results of the different subsidy structures tested. In the
base model, the Ethanol Production Incentive had the largest payout and the greatest
impact on risk of bankruptcy, which shows it functions as intended to give ethanol plants
greater support when market conditions are more difficult.   In the 2006 through 2008
sensitivity, the Ethanol Production  Incentive payment dropped  by nearly half, which
demonstrates how the subsidy reduces support as market conditions improve. Conversely,
the alternative subsidies made significantly larger payments under improved market
conditions of the 2006 through 2008 sensitivity, essentially increasing support to ethanol
plants as conditions improve,  rather than reducing support as logic would dictate.
6.3.         Study Limitations
For this study, a model was developed to determine the impact of the Ethanol
Production Incentive on plant survivability and explore ways the subsidy could be structured
more efficiently. One issue that arose was the limited data available for price of ethanol and
DDGS in North Dakota since detailed records did not exist until only a few years ago. With a
better DDGS data set, it would  be possible to forecast future DDGS prices particular to
North Dakota.  Forecasting DDGS prices would allow a more accurate representation of plant
net income.
Another limitation was the lack of local survey data. Given the differing characteristics
of each ethanol  plant, individual plant production costs vary greatly while each geographic
location offers certain advantages and disadvantages. The technical data used to determine
plant costs were survey data from plants located throughout the Midwest, and while it was
the best data available, none of the plants surveyed were in North Dakota (Perrin, Fretes, &
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Sesmero, 2008). The lack of local data creates the potential for biased results that do not
necessarily reflect what ethanol plants in  North Dakota are experiencing.
An additional issue that made a study pertaining to North Dakota difficult was the
state's legislation. At present the specific goals of the North Dakota legislation remain
unclear, which was a significant limitation to this study. While designed to enhance the
survivability of new plants, it is uncertain whether the Ethanol Production Incentive is meant
to encourage new plant construction or to simply keep plants in business. It is also unclear
whether the legislature intends to adapt the program when ethanol plants using cellulosic
technology are constructed.
The formula used to calculate the subsidized rate of return on equity is another piece of
the study that could  be improved.  In years with large losses, the subsidy reduced the size of
the loss and preserved plant equity. However, in the following years when net income was
once again positive, the rate of return on equity was higher for the non-subsidized plant
because the plant had less equity. This minimized the impact the subsidy had on rate of
return and resulted in instances where the subsidized lo-year average rate of return on
equity was lower than the non-subsidized rate of return.
Finally, price spikes were another limitation for this study. Spikes are more difficult to
forecast since the most recent spike is atypical to what the prices have been historically. The
spike also needed to be included  because given the continued volatility in prices, another
spike in the future is possible.
6.4.        Future study
Another significant input in ethanol production not simulated here is energy cost; in
most cases natural gas. With the recent price spike of fossil fuels, the cost of energy to
produce ethanol is another area where producers are vulnerable. A subsidy for energy costs
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is an alternative to the current method of subsidizing ethanol plants that could be
examined.
Cellulosic technology is seen as the future of ethanol production, and with this new
technology come new questions regarding how these plants will survive the fluctuating
markets. The Ethanol Production Incentive could  be redesigned to provide assistance for
these new plants in adverse markets.
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DDGS Sensitivity
APPENDIX A
This section adds DDGS as a stochastic variable to the base model. Corn and ethanol
prices are also correlated to DDGS.
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APPENDIX 8
2006-2008 Sensitivity
This section uses the base model with distributions and correlations generated from 2006-
2008 data.
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Figure 8.23. Three-Year Average Payment per Gallon  Forecast 2006-2008.
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Figure 8.24. Total Three-Year Average Payment Forecast 2006-2008.
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Figure a.25.  Net Income Three-Year Average 2006-2008.
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Figure  8.26.  Net Income 2006-2008 with  Net Income Three-Year
Average 2006-2008.
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Figure 8.27.  Rate of Return on  Equity Three-Year Average 2006-2008.
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Figure 8.28.  Rate of Return on Equity 2006-2008 with Rate of Return on Equity
Three-Year Average 2006-2008.
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Figure a.29. Ten-Year Rate of Return on  Equity 2006-2008 with  10-Year Rate of
Return on  Equity Three-Year Average 2006-2008.
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Figure a.30.  Risk of Bankruptcy Three-Year Average 2006-2008.
85
APPENDIX C
Corn Price 2006-2008 with DDGS Sensitivity
This section uses the base model with  DDGS as stochastic and using distributions with
correlations generated from 2006-2008 data.
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Figure C.1. Corn  Price 2006-2008 DDGS.
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Figure C.2.  Ethanol  Price  DDGS 2006-2008.
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Figure C.3.  DDGS Price 2006-2008.
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Figure C.4.  Net  Income  DDGS 2006-2008.
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Figure C.5.  Rate of Return on  Equity DDGS 2006-2008.
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Figure C.6. Ten-Year Average  Rate of Return on  Equity DDGS 2006-2008.
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Figure C.7.  Risk of Bankruptcy DDGS 2006-2008.
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